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DII'ERIAT. ERITAT.N
The Americans h,lve discovered that, in·
stead of the experiences of W40 and 1!:l4 L
e1lllstening the British, the latter have reo
mained the same egocentric imperialists
Arne/'iea linew bl~fore. The attitude of
London towurd India amI the Near ElIst,
in plLrticular, has led to much tension. As
10/lg U.'cl the l~ngLillh were on their last leg~,
the Americans wero prepared to disregard
the cost of SJ.wiJlg them. Today, however,
the American t.axpayer!; do not see why
they !;hould finance the further existence of
the Empire without nny compensation. In
t.hcir eyes, for illstancc, th(' ce sion of British
bases in th(, Western Hemisphere in return
for American li\'c!\ and goods would be no
more t,hall fair. And if Churchill said in
spring: "There is not the slightest q Ilcstion
of uny cCRsion of British territory-not the
slightest," the Americans know that this
was addres.. ed to them, and they resent it.
The two publications which have donO'
much to crystallize the American distrust o(
England arc Wendell Willkio's One World
glorio\l>l allies. In I!H 7 the United State!!
hnd f'nt.ered the Great War under the slogans
of "The War to End All Wars" and "Make
the World Safe for Ot>mocmcy." Twent,v.
fivo years later t.hese slogans were not
employed all Ruch, bllt in principle the feel·
ing was much the same.
But threu yean; hlwe possed sinec PC'nrl




The 11101/1· j",porlmll cO.lc/lptioll" oj Ihe politi"al JlIltlrll of Ih tl"M'ld (Ire thMe
IIJ (lc.rma"y. Japa". "IV Sovid I '"iolt. ollft 1M (: .....-t. 'l'llttll Ihue IIr thcMfl oj Gnal
/trit"i" "lid oj thc ,I&tJdi.llm·"izw "/1(/ ",,"tlt l1/'lltex. 7'ho IlflrllulI~ IIlId Japo"ue COli·
,·c1>/io".• "r~ ",rlt Jm()l/"l 10 all /110,'" /-i.rriny il/. Axi.• Illrl·ito,.ies. Al1 for Ihe Soviet
ideolo(J!I. I/'e 'l(1I1 I'1I.bjeded l1.i" to all ,,,,,,I:,/.•i,, ill Ollr "rli,.le ",<;Iati•• Ihe Hi,,-
lorillll" (Orl,)/) r /944). I" 1JI folluwi"!1 p"gr" we "hall deal u·illa Ihe atti'uck oj
the AmerjclI"" on Ihll III...is oj r"clr'l"ivc ""d rCeIl'" ./U,l rial.
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81NCE it·!; coming into being ILS lUI, independent, Htate, the United ~ta.teI.lho.~, ali a rellult of ita geographical
position, had three possible choicell
for Itll foreign policy: iRolatioll, im·
peria.li!;m, alld world co-opemtioll. In
American history, all three of theso pOSllibili-
ties ho.\'e played a role' indeed', one might
s,ay thllt they are latent in every American.
The country's forcign policy depended on
which of the three principlcs predominated
at the time. Woodrow Willlon reprellellted
world co-operation. From lIllU to L931;,
the isolationist mood dominated and. Wall
exprOHBed, for example, by the neutrality
legislation of the thirtietl. When under
Roosevelt's influence Ameriea took ILO active
part' again in world politics, the people
themselves followed hesitAtingly. AItA~r
Pearl Harbor, isoltLtionism difilLppcared.
At first, Ulany Americans actually reglU'ded
the war as an altruistic crusade against evil,
and they enjoyed the feeling of a common
caURe with the United Nations. Just lUI at
the outbreak of a war the indivi(llull cheer·
fully joins the ranks of his nation, so the
Atnet'icans, after twenty yea.rs of isolation,
"ere uplifted by the feeling of being part
of a world community. They felt the urge
to glorify th~ir partners and cnthutliaiiltically
(lid so. England, which they had so often
regarded with distrust, IlOW became the
'~tight Little isla,nd" which had heroically
withtltood the Germlln onsla.ught,; even the
Boillheviks, whom tbey had hated for two
and a half decades, turned into heroes and
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with its accusation of Britiilh imperialism,
linrl that much.quoted editorial in Life of
October 12, 1942, which cloarly expressed
that which most Americans were already
feeling (see Appendix).
America went to war against the idea she
had formed of Germany and against the
claim to European hegemony that she
believed to see embodied in Germany. 1....or
some time now, she has begun to realize
that, in the case of victory, she will be
fneed by a claim to world hegemony in the
form of the Soviet Union. The illusion that
Stalin's intentions were limited and that all
he wllllted to do was to drive out the Ger-
Illans from the Soviet Union, in order to be
able to devote himself again to the welfare
of his subjects, has received crushing blows.
.J ust as England was closest to t.he hearts
of the Americans in the days of Dunkirk,
so the Soviet Union was at the peak of its
popularity in the USA during the weeks of
Stalingrad. Today, however, when the Red
flag is wa,ving over large parts of Eastern
Europe and the Russians are making not
the least provision for a halt in their advance,
the old Huspicion of the Red peril ill rearing
its head again. With consternation the
Americans are looking on while Stalin, pay-
ing no heed whatever to the Atlantic Charter,
and not bothering to ask anyone else's
opinion or to ent·er upon discussions, is
steadily pursuing the path which he deems
the right one and whieh the Americans are
coming more and more to dislike.
The Am~ricans llsed to claim that, in
dcaling with Hitler, there was only one
choice: endless appN\.'iCment or force. Now
t.bey have r~lized that this actually applie.'l
to their .relations with Stalin, and that they
must either let him have his way or oppose
him with force. No wonder that in America
one hears more and more mention of a third
world war, among others from the mouths
of Henry Wallace, Wendell Willkie, Sumner
Welles, William Bullitt, and Norman
Thomas. The words of those who, like Karl
H. von Wiegand an,1 Demaree BellS, have
raised their voices in warning of the Soviet
Ulli(\n, are being paid more heed than a
year vr two ago. "h it not tragicomical,"
wrote the New York ltfjrror l\ few weeks
ago, "to sec Russia alcl our partner while
the mouth of the RURKian beur is dripping
with Polish and Finnish blood and its rapa-
ciOU:i elaws are stretching from Alaska to
England's throat?" The Soviet press is
indicating growing concern over the Amer-
ican criticism of the USSR; and Time reportl
the symptomatic fact that Cornell Univer-
sity. whose RU8.'1ian Department was hitherto
in the hands of professors with Communid
leanings, invited the journalist William
Henry Chamberlin, well known for hia
critical attitude toward the Soviet Union, to
give lectures during the past summer term.
In December 1943 the USA and the
USSR concluded an agreement accordins
to which America would grant the Sovie...
a lO-billion-doUar postwar credit, chiefly in
the form of industrial plantR. At firRt the
American business world hailed this plan u
an important IItep toward combating un-
employment in postwar America. But i~
was not long before the first doubts began
to appear. Walter Bosshard, the Washing-
ton correspondent of the Neue Zurcher
Zeilu1lg, reported that the American experta
examining the orders planned by the Rua-
sians found that these orders went far beyond
the requirementR of actual reconstruction.
"Not without anxiety," wrote Bosshard, ".
tho question being weighed as to whether
Russia, whose labor is far cheaper than
American labor, may not wit.hin a com-
paratively short time appear as an unwel-
comt' competitor. especially on the Asiatic
markets." Hence there W88 little mention
in American trade journals of recent montlut
about the 10-billion-dollar credit. Fim
they spoke of 5. then of 3, and most recently
even of only 1 billion dollars. And the
time can be foreseen when the fact that &
Il\rge part of the Soviet industry W&8 de-
stroyed by the war will fill the Americana
with a feeling less of pity than of relief.
PANOS 0.' CONSCIENCE
The press and radio of America have
during the last two years become more and
more critical toward Chungking, and during
1944 the American journalists reported little
that was good from Chungking. While the
Chungking Government is being called un·
democratic and corrupt, the reports cabled
home by American journalists last summer
ubout their prolonged stay in the Communist
parts of China were filled with praise. The
professorial manner in which the American
short-wave radio seeks to advise Chungking
every day represents a continuous inter·
ference in Chungking's domestic affairs.
The recall of General Stilwell and departure
of Ambassador Gauss have openly revealed
the existing conflict.
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The long series of defeats suff('red b;r the
Chungking armies during the l!l..'~t few months
is causing anxiety to the Americans, who
nrc plagued by I.\. guilty conscience toward
China. And wh('n we have a. guilty eon-
llCience toward someone, this generally docs
not make him nnv more likeable to us.
On the contrary, ~o look for anything to
assuage our conscience and emphasize the
unfavorable traits in the other in order to
take comfort in the thought: he isn't worth
being treated differently.
NO SANTA CLAUS
As a heritage from the unpaid debts of
the first World War, the Americans have
retained a justified suspicion that they will
not be paid the debts of World War II
either. In the first exuberance of t.heir war
enthusiasm they gave little thought to this;
nor were the amounts involved ,-cry large.
Meanwhile, however, they have mounted to
many billions, and the early enthusiasm has
cooled off. Americans a.re beginning to
worry whether Uncle Sam is not being
played for a lIucker or rega.rded as Santa
Claus by the United Nations. In October,
(',ongressman A. L. Miller voiced the sus-
picion that the 10-billion-dollars' worth of
Lend-Lease deliveries would never be paid
back by the British who, by figuring every
slightest British delivery or help, cven in
F;ngland, as "reverse Lend-Lense," consider
their debts as already more or less canceled.
When Roosevelt made his report to Con-
~ess on Lend-Lease activitips in August
1943, it contained a cautiolls intimation that
the AJlies would not have to repay this debt.
But Congre.88 and the public responded so
~lntagonistieallyto this that Roosevelt quick-
ly retracted, declaring he knew nothing about
the disputed paragraph and that it had
probably been inscrted through the negligence
of a secretary.
THE EUROPEAN ~OLE
The feeling toward Europe ha.'! also
("hanged. When they entered the war, t.he
American" had figured out things very
nicely: the Ot1rmans would be defelltcd,
J.~urope would be liberated, and ev('rything
would be fine. Instead of which they arc
now beginning to realize that ev('rything is
Iloing quite differNlt.ly. In sout-hern und
central Italy t,hero is a deprcssin~ chaos
from which 80 far only the Bolsheviks have
benefited; in the Balkans the Sm'iotA seem
to have come to stay; and France and
Belgium are disrupted by internal conflicts.
The American is accustomed in his vast
continent without tratutions to tackle things
according to the maxims of (~onUllon IICnllC.
Europe is to him a jungle of traditions,
ideologies, and contradictions which tire him
out, annoy him, and make him long for the
wide open spaces of his own continelit. Add
to this the Americau's increasingly guilty
conscience toward Europe on seeing how,
with the aid of his armies and his Lond-
Lease goods, Stalin is dying one picco of
Europe red after another. Tbe reaction is,
as in the case of China, to run down the
object of the guilty conscience: Europe is
a hopeless case: say the Americans the more
distasteful they find the job of "liberating"
Europe. May the devil or Stalin take the
Europeans, the whole lot of them! They
don't deserve any better!
EXIT WILLKIE
The contest between the late Wendell
Willkie and Thomas E. Dewey for the
Republican Presidential nomination supplied
an interesting barometer of the mood in
America. Willkie, whom Tim~ called "Wen-
dell (me too) Willkie," because he imitated
Roosevelt on all essential points, had com·
mitted himself to an idealistic international
co-operation in his utterances, and had
adhered to this even after Roosevelt bad
long abandoned it. His series of articles
appearing in a large number of newspapcr8
in June 1944 culminated in the words:
Our sovereignty is not something to be hoarded.
but something to be used. The United States
8hould U80 its 80vereignty in cooperation with
other powOrM to create an effective intomational
organization for tho good of all. Small nations
8hould hnvo n 81ly; tfloir destiny ..hould not be
de<"irled by the Il'ront powertl. "Tho Republican
rlationn should Btllte the convi,·tion thllt, Mr.
Churchill to t.he contrary, the ideologies for whi'lh
we fight have not be<-ome blurred for liS ••••
We are fighting a war for freedom ... not. only
at home but everywhere in the world.
Dewey, on the other hand, did not commit
himself to any definite foreign policy. It is
true tbat, in order not to appear as an
isolationist, he mnde a few statements ex-
prestling his willingness to support interna-
tional co-operation. But he did this in an
incomparably more cautious form than
Willkie; and the foreign-policy plank of
the R;}pu blican Party was purposely kept
ext remely vague.
When Willkie, nfter his ignominious dt'feat
at t,he Wisconsin Primaries in April, with-
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drew from tbe race, Time wrote (17.4.44):
.. "~veryonc suddenly realized that this was
a most significant election-most important
oeoasion since Pearl Harbor .... Wisconsin
had clearly voted no confidenco in global
good will I.md foroign policy of generalitiell.
They had votecl against the 'crusade' kind
of internationalism." And the international-
ly minded .V IV York Tim-es wrote sadly that
with WiHkie '·the only uble Repu blican"
had withdrawn from the campaign.
Dewey's victory over Willkill was a proof
of America's disillusionment over world
politics; ami among the millions wbo
gave their vote to Uewl;')" on ~ovcmber 7
there werl;' many who did so because they
knew that he wanted to bo President of tho
United State~ ami IIUt !\. wudd messiah.
Another symptom of the cluLIIge in AmE'I'·
ioan feeling IS Huuscvelt's attitude. Roose-
velt has oftell Leen compared wit,h Woodrow
\\'ilson. liut in chara·t I' thl'v llrc ItS
different as an II, Wilsoll Was Ii professor
with hi!:! h /ld in the clouds who fa.iled
miserably when he n,ttempted to cling to
hi/:! ideals. I~oosevclt is a thoroughly ac-
cumplished politician who. for rcaRons of
political expediency, like/:! to act thc part of
1m idealist without b illg one. His velvol.
g.love hides n. delib rat-e imperin.lism, Just
as he hail turned the majorit.v of tho Centml
and •'outh America.1I "tates int;() vassals of
the liSA by hill 80·clllled "Good Neighbor"
policy, :<0 he wOllld like by mOllns of an
apparently altrui tic policy to make large
pa.rts of the world dep'ndent on Washingt-on.
Time and again, Roosevelt hIlS shown
himself to be a Dluster of psychology, Three
years ago he won the hearts of the Americans
for himself &ml his plans by tht' ideali tic
formulations of the Atla.ntic Chartor, in
which he himself, bing the shrewd realist
he is, can never have believed. Today hc
is trying to exploit the disillusionment, of tJlI~
nation for his world plans. Thoso of his
friends and colla.borators who. lik' Henry
Walla.ce and SlIInner \.\ elles. had committed
themselves too strongly to tho idea of
altruistic world co.operation, were ruthlessly
thrown overboard: and Rinec I!I43 til('
strainl'l of t,he Atla.ntic Charkr aro no longer
t,o be heard in his public ut.terllIlCt's.
WlJ\.' "UNCONIHTI NAL ~URIt~~NI)t:It' ~
Sym ptoUlat i' of H,oosevelt '" nt.titude IS
the "unconditiunal surrender" thosi:<. .. 'n-
conditional surrcnder is an Ameri 'IUI idea,"
wrote the London Observer a few montM
ago, "dating from the U.S. Civil War, &
conflict in which one side or the other had
to give in completely. Europe offers no
U.S. parallel." Stalin hl\8 never agreed to
this thesis and has ostentatiously chOllen
another path in his negotiatiolls with Ruma-
nia and Finland. Churchill, too, has been
C<1.utious. Tho . unconditional 8urrender
the:;is belongs t-o Roosevelt. He first for·
mulated it in Casablanca, and he re-em·
phnsized it in mid-August l!J44 ,
Roosevelt has often been r('proached in
the Allied camp with forcing t,ho Gemlan
und Japanese nations to a fanllLical resistan
by this t,hcsis, tllllS prolonging t,he war. It h83
beon l:luggested that, like \"'Ihmn, h should
Illwc eithel' penlUllded part uf the enemy
population Ly means of friendly peacu
prospects to tlisculltinue the war or attempted
to shorten the war by a reasonable nego-
,in ted peace, These critic" do not grasp tb
fl\('t that in W~:j and I!14-t Ho 'e\'elt w
1101. in the leust inlere. ted in short Bing th I
war. Had pl'ace 'ome befom tho autumn
of 1944, Roosevelt would huvo lost his main
a,rgument in the ('leetion ('umpuign, namely
that he was irreplaceable for the victoriou..
cont.inuation of the war. (:\ poll of public
opinion in July revealed thut if the war
were still on by November 7 Roosevelt
wuuld get 50.8 per cent and Dewey 42.2 per
'ent of th . votes, but if th war were over
Dcwey 4H.O pCI' cent and Roosovelt 4O.t
per cent!) Furthermore' the longer the war
h1stS. the more wiIJ German\'- 0 bittt>rh'
hilletl b\· Roosevelt-be tl'l\n;formed int{) ~
pile of r'ubble; the more will America's alli~
110 weakened; the greater will bo the weight
of AmE'rica, tho last great power to enter
'he war and tho one to dispose of the greatest.
rcs rves; the more extensive will be th
d _strllction of large parts of Europe and
Asia, whose reconstruction ill to offer Amer·
ica unlimited markets and IL far-reachin.
('ulltrol of the!lo regions.
lJicl not H.ooseve'lt's economic adviser, the
t1nancier Bernard Baruch, recently give as II
reason for his optimism about American
postwar economics the fact that the United
I 'tates could plut,icipate after tho war in the
rcconst.ruction of half the world! And when
tho Wall Street .Jour-nat write/:!: "American
lwilding expert,s anticipate large quantitic
of American mllchinery such as dredger!!.
dl:'OlOlition machines, cranes, etc., huving to
be . upplied to the reconstruction areM.
American arehitects, construction engineel'l!;
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aDd ot.her firms connected in one way or
another with reconstruction will open branoh·
ea in the areas devastated by the war or
delegate their representatives," and utters a
w&rning aglUnst "overhasty reconstruction
of the bombed cities according to obsolete
plans," does that not souud as if tbill organ
of Amcrican high finance were afraid tbat
~:urope might pOKSibly do its own z'eeOlI-
lItructing without profits to America~
I'EELL"OS TOW"Rll OTHER :SATIOI\S
To the same extent to which the inter·
national idealism is vanjshing among the
Americl\T!s, their realistic imperialism if<
moving into the foreground,
(1) For the last ycur or 80, tho neutrall:!
havc not found much sympathy in America.
Tho very conception of neutrality no longer
fit.l:l into Amencn's prcllent. ideology, as iii
shown ill a.nothcr artICle in this issue.
(2) The European mtlm bera of the United
Nations arc not very highly thought of.
Tho Americans arl) clever enough to know
that refugce governnH'lltil or governments u.
1& Bononu, Vc Gaulle, Picrlot, are unstablc
institutionl:! wtLich demand a lot but have
little to ofTer or say. France, whether rep-
I' .!lOnted hy Petain or hy De Gaulle ha.~
been treated by Amcriea cmphat,ically ail a
nonecl'lfd. In llny CallI.', thero is the dunger
that tho United StateR treats those stat.es
not belonging to til£' Rmnll number of grent
1>0wel'l; in the same way all she has been
accustomed for (leonde's to t.reat ~icaragua
and other Cent.ral American republics.
(3) The South American states havo
proved often enough that they have only
joined the United Nll,tions with reluctance
and aro not interested in the war.
So u.ll that remain!! i!'l the Big Four. Anrl
it is to them that t.he planned postwar
organization applies. The League of NlItior.l:I
has had a poor preKS in the USA. Not only
has it beell discredited hy the abuse of itl!
strengt.h in the twenticl! and the obviolls
djRplay of its weakness during the thirties.
In an America which rejects even the idea
of nelltrality then' can he 110 place for an
orgnll like the Leaguo of Nations which, Itt
least in its phraS<'ology, was comparatively
neutral and democratic.
The conception formed in America of the
orgunization of the world differs e.~ntiR.lIy
trom the idNds of tho League of Nations.
Since State Secretary Hull's declaration on
March 21, WH, so much has boon said and
written about this organizution, and tbt'
Du.mbarton Oa,kll Conference (August 21 t.o
October 7, 1\H4) has supplied I:!O much
additional material, that It is po:;aible to
form a fairly clear idea of the American
plans. (See Appendix for a condemlation of
the Dumbarton Oaks plan.)
According to these, the leadorship in the
postwar period is to be in the hanos of the
Big ].'our: t.he US.-\, the ussn, Great Brit.ain,
and China, to which .France may later be
added as the fifth power. We see that tht'
idea of all states being equa.lly subjected to
the world organization has disappeared, u.:;
has the idea of an independent international
police force superior even to the great;
powers, ideas propagated in tho clI.rly stnges
of the war and championed by Willkic UH
to his death. The role of the General
Assembly is limited to an advisory function.
.The world organization propOlled by the
Dumbartoll Uaks Conference could easily bo
transformed into [t dictllLorfihip of the four
powers, who on the plea of pn'sNving pcaCtl
could enforce t.heir will 011 weuker natIOns,"
said t,he l:S Foreign Policy Association.
Well, some people may have no object.ion
to this. But what if thc Big Four dlsagre
with euch other!
Absolutely cssentilll to the fUllctioning of
the plan is llll!tnimity among the Gig Four.
Thill existll at pre8cnt a8 IIII' Illl the war
agaim'lt Germany is concernt'd. But not
even optimists believe that it will continuo
to exist in the postwar world. The Soviet..,
made it perfectly cleat· at Dum barton Oaks
t,llltt t.hey had no intention of submitting to
a majonty decision of the Security Council
directed against them. Th£' commentary
of a leading C::; radio station reprinted in
our AppendiX shows that tlH' Americans feel
likewise. It aiNo brings out tbe biggest
hitch in postwar Big Four co-operation.
SOVEltElllNT¥ OR COMMUNITY?
Fundamentally, the American postwar
plans ure concerned not with a world organi.
zation of nations but with the continuance
of the wa,r·born alliance of the Big :I-"our.
The proposed postwar world organization
la(~ks the basic condjtion which might make
it into It truo loague of nat.ion!l: tIlt' surrender
of absolute IlOvereignty by the member
I!tates. Shortly before his death, Wendell
Willkie openly spoke of thill in Gollier's,
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when he wrote about the election platforms
of the R~pllblican and Democrat.ic Parties:
The platforms of both partiOll ('ontain aD ire
reconcilable p'tru.c\ox which in il8 I'lnin implication
",m only confuse. deceive Bnl! l!i..illusion the
Amerielln poople. This paradox is provided by
the fuet that pormanont or lastinJl pollee cannot
bo altuined without what is popularly called 1088
of lIOvoreignly. We arc presenled ";th this extrnor.
.linlU'y prop.:»<ilion: wo are jealoWily to guard
our sovoroignty. but l!Omehow all nations arc t~
ho welued together inl~ on int.ernntional organi7.a,.
tion wil.h power to prevent aggression and pr080rve
peace.
\Vhenever a party to a propollO<l agreement
stunus pat and refU86ll to yiold any individual
right or privilege. there is no agrooment. Yet. it
ill under similar eonditions that wo tllik of creating
or participating in an int.emational organization.
Whl1t we shall croot.e ill at best " cOllllllltati\'e pact
between "ponco-Ioving" nntiollll. an urrangement
which may bo different in words but which. in
flwt. will not diller Ilt all from most of the alliances
in history.
ActuaUy it is impossible to imagine a
functioning world organization-no more
than any organization within the framew&rk
of a f/rossraum, an individual state, or a
ftLmily-without the individual or the group
Ilurrendering pa.rt of their 80vereignty.
Absolute sovereignty and community are
irTCConcila.ble. One must choo.'W between
the two, and America has made her
choice. Roo.'Klvelt made thill clear when
he declared at lL press conference early in
.Junc: "The United States has an objective
today to join other nations for the general
world peace-bllt without taking away the
integrity of the United StalL'S in any shape,
manner, or form." For those slow of
j.\'rasp, Time added: "Integrity was the
Roo:«:vclt word for sovereignty." This
makes all the hopes formerly placed by
Ulany Americans on a postwar community
of nations wholly illusory.
BIG FOUR-TIfREE-TWO
Among the Big j<""our, Chungking China,
compared to the other three, is only goo-
~raphical1y big. Hence America is speaking
more and more frequently. of tho Big Three.
The New York correi'lpondent of the S'Ien8J;;a
lJarjbladet formulated it as follows:
It is beeominjZ increasingly (·loor that Roosevelt.
Churchill. and Stltlin are of the opinion that t.he
postwar world oruer (,an best be maintained if
the military powor remllillR in the hands of thosa
now holding it. viz.. in tho hanus of the USA.
Ureat Britain. lUl<l Ru. sia.
But whcn the Americans subject the Big
Three to a closer scrutiny, thoy find that
t.hey actually only consist of Big Two. For
BOrne of them, these Big Two are the USA
and the U' R, e.g., for Time, which wrote
on May 8, 1M4: "The U.S. and thc U.S.S.R.
are Im'luestionably Great Powers, Britain is
a conditional Great Power .... China is ..
potential Great Power."
Others sec the U. A and Great Britain in
the Big Two. Among them is the well·
known American General Patton, who pub-
licly declared in May: "Undoubtedly it ill
Britain's and America's destiny to rule the
world." (Ollly in the revised version of
this statement was the USSR included
among the General's choice of world rulers.)
In the preliminary work for the UNRRA
a clear tendency toward Anglo-American
exclusiveness Wa.8 revealed. Walter Bosshard
reported from Atlantic City that the im.
pression among the delegatcs of the UNRRA
Conference WM that "England and the
USA wish to retain the entire relief work in
their own hands." In the Combined Raw
Materials Board, which has to supply the
raw materials for the UNRRA and on
which in con~equence aU UNRRA activity
depends, America and-to a far leaaer
degree-England are the BOle rolers.
BIG ONE
But if one section of the Americans think
they can get along without England and
another without the Soviet Union, there
finally remains only the Big One. Indeed,
the Americans are becoming accustomed
to the idea of being the "Big One." And in
order to ju tify a high level of arma-
ments after the war, American leaders
are a.lready spreading the fantastic assertion
that Germany is even now preparing for &
third world war and that General von
StUlpnagel ha been appointed to work out
the necessary plans for it.
By such and similar processe8 of thought.
America is seeking to vindicate her mono·
imperialism in her own eyes. Although she
pretends that it is only the forco of cir-
cumstance that has temporarily pLaced the
lead among the United Nations in Amcrica'8
hands, the recent conferences in the Allied
camp have shown that the Americans are
finding it increasingly strange when other
nations want their own way. Ycsterday
thcy were accusing Germany and Japan of
suffering only puppets around them; today
they ought to have a look in the mirror.
The "Big One" attitude finds expression
in the most varied fields. During the
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DegOtiations fir"t in London and tbl'n in
Qlicago on t.he future organizat.ion of world
air traffic, EnglJ\nd represented the view
that a supernational organization should be
created to run or at least to superviSt' nir
communications. America, on the other
hand, objected. In her feeling of great
IUpcriority in aircraft construction, ehe
wishl'8 t.o see no barriers raised agllin!'!t her
future expansion in the air. The America.n
Office for Civil Aeronautics submitted a
gigantic program last summer which pro·
vides for the establishment of air lines
totaling 140,000 miles to encircle the globe
at various latitudes, under American mana.ge·
mcnt. Time pll\8tically -'describes the im·
pression the world map showing the planned
lines made upon the foreign representatives:
''The British stared when they saw blue
lines running through British territories.
The Dutch came to worry about their KLM
(Royal Dutch Air Lines) interests. The
enigmatic Russians came and went, enig.
matically. "
The demand has been voiced repeatedly
in Congre88 that America must in future
have the largest fleet in the world.
NaturaUy, this largest of all air and naval
flcet..~ also requires a large numher of bases.
Secretary of the Navy Forresta.l, who
demands conscription for the time after the
war, said in the Sat'urday Evening Post:
"We must have bnses wherever our strate·
gists deem them necessary." Roosevelt
himself, in his Seattle speech Ia.~t August,
raised a demand for ba.'>CS in the Western
Pacific. As for the South Pacific, he
declared :
There are hundred" or lJmall i"lands ill till'
Southern Pacific which are in British and Jo'rench
poll(lession. We do not want them. but Britain
.md France might be happy to enter int.o lIJl agree·
ment by which these islands could enjoy additional
prot.ection.
In America's foreign-trade policy. there
has always been 1\ contradiction between a
desire for her own sphere of influence closed
to the rest of the world and for an Open
Door policy in the re"t of the world, As a
principle, the European Grossraum as en·
visaged by Germany or the Co-Prosperity
Sphere in l<~aHt AHia is no less distasteful to
the American business world than the
British Empire. A!'! was explained in Gun·
nar Myrdal's article in our Novl'mber issue,
the Ameri('ans will be faced bv thl" alter·
nl\t,ive in the year~ of dl'mobiliza.tion of
cit her changing their domest.ic economic and
social structure or conquering new markets
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for a \"ast export trade. It. goes without
saying that the latter would be more to
their liking. The American trade mu.ga.zine
Iron a.lId Coal 'l'ra.de1's' Revil'w recently
wrote: "A vnst amount of shutting down
cannot be avoidcd in American heavy in·
dustry if we do not succeed in achievillg an
immense expansion of market.s in comparison
to the peace.time markets." For this pur-
pose the Americans are trying to exploit the
positions gained hy Lend·Lease as well as
their military conquests.
Another paradox: on the one hlmd the
Americans want to export lUI much lUl
possible, on the other they do not wish to
open their markets to foreign goods to be
supplied in return, nor have they any idea
as to what to do with more gold. I t is
hard to imagine what the future American
foreign trade is supposed to look like.
ROOSEVEI.T AND CONORESS
Of the three foreign. political principles we
mentioned at the beginning of this article,
isolationism and imperialism get on quite
well with each other. Both place the in·
terests of the United States before every-
thing else. And just as it is the Rtrong
point of US imperialism that it can fall back
upon an almost unl\8Sl\ilable hemisphere, so
is the American isolationist plcased over
every increase of America's power in t.he
world-alwa.ys with the reservation: if one
day we should cease to like it we can
withdraw aga.in to America. Hence the
activities directed at creating an American
sphere under the leadership of the USA
and those directed at strengthening American
influence on a world.wide seale go parallel.
This fact is of great importanee to Amer-
ica's foreign policy during Roosevelt's fourth
term. If Roosevelt were really the idealist
he pretended to be during the day" of the
Atlantic Charter, he would be so much at
variance with the disillusioned American
people over questions of foreign policy that
last month's election would have confronted
him with as hostile a ConjO'Css M Wilson
had to face in 1919, But Roosevelt is not
a Wilson, and the Congrcs8lonal election reo
suits ha.ve proved thl\t Roosevelt, intrinsi·
cally always It realist., and the di8Cll(~hanted
Americans have mct on a middle line 88
rega.rds fort'ign policy.
What were the ren~ons for Congrc88's
opposition to Wilson in I9HH Let u!'! quote
from a poplllar American schoolhook :
THE XXth CENTURY
TIIO pointll of complaint were t.hat the MOver-
eignty of t.he United StatCtl was M<!ritlccd. Ulat we
were pledged to make war t·o tho bidding of the
cOUI\('il of tho 1e6gUC. that we would be eternally
embroiled in t.he qualTtl18 of Europe. that purol~?
domCllI ic qUtllltionK like immigratiol1 lRWIl and the
ltlriff woro lIubjll<'tOO to the in1erforellt.'El of other
nation8. that Groat Briulin W8>l repreolOl1tecl by 8ix
loimCllIWl many voi~ in Iho ll88embly of tho lcoague
1111 wo were.
The postwar ideas propagated by Roose-
velt arc enough to show liS that none of
these points of complaint holds good today.
If thc Twohey Analysis of Newspaper
Opinion calculated in April that "the press
approval of AdminiRtration foreign policy
hl\tl declined from t:iO% support to 20%."
this indicated IC88 an opposition to Roose-
velt's policy than the reverberations of
America s disappointment at foreign. political
developmentll IUld at her allie.~ as well as a
feeling of uncertainty ill question8 of foreign
policy. Thi~ uncerla,inty nuty also be the
rpsult of ltoosevelt's increascd taciturnity.
At UIO tillle wben Roosevelt covered his
policy with an altruistic cloa,k of world
Iibemtion, there WllS nothing to prevent
him from expressing himself fre<plently on
this ideal. In t,ho present emphatically
imperialistic period, however, he deems it
wiser to keep silent. us a prel:lcntation of
Amcrica" foreign.political motivell would
aroulle apprehension in the rest of the world.
HEXECU'l'ln.; AOREE;\l~:NT"
Although Roosevelt and mllny Americans
t,hu!'4 a~ee in principlc on t.he aims of Amer·
ica's foreign policy, it is umlerstandable
that Roosevelt sJlould have sought to cover
himself for all e\'entualities. The Senate,
i.e., the upper house in (',ongrctlS, has a voice
in America's foreign policy. Tho American
Conl:ltitutiolJ, says: "[The President] 8hall
havo powel' by an,1 with the I\d\'iee and
conllCnt of the Senate to make t.reaties, pro-
vided two thirds of the Scnutors prosent
concur. "
Thil:l paragraph, meant to prot~t the
democracy against too self·willed presirlents,
is rosponsible for a. well-known paradox
within America's foreijlll policy. On the one
hlHld, the Con:stitution gives the Pre.<idcnt
and the State J>epartment under him un-
limiterl powers to conduct all negotiations
with foreign countric!'; on the other hand.
the trcatiOll concluded by hinl nre not valid
without the appro\'al of two thirds of the
Senate. This paradox led to WiI8on's disaster.
Since a constitutional amendment to reo
mo\'c the demand for n two-thirds' majority
of the Senate seems improbable, Rooeev6h
baa endeavored to get his way by otbel'
means. Through officials of the State De-
partment a.nd his own publicists, he bas b8d
a theory developed according to which ~
President may also, instead of signing
treaties requiring the two·thirds majomy
of the Senate. choose the form of an ··I~xecu.;
tive Agrooment," which requires merely a
simple majority in the Senate and HOUBO of
Representatives. The propagators of thitt
doctrine can point to the fact that the 811.
ncxation of 'l'exaa and Hawaii during the
last century took place by meaDS of sucb
"Executive Agreements."
The new doctrine has two advantages for
Roosevelt.. .1"jrst of all, it {mables him to
replace the difficult two·thirds' majority by.
a simple majority, Illueh more easily obtain·
able. And secondly, it contrivOll the inclusion.
of the House of Representatives, which WlUI,
hitherto without intluence upon foroigti
po!iC'y, t.hus getting it on the side of the
President. While Wilson wngcd his battle
excll!sively again!~t the Senate and was
defeated, Roosevelt, bv Illeans of the Ktecu-'
live Agreement, is in 'a, position to playoff
the House Ilgaillst the Senate or \'ice vers&
in questions of foreign policy, just all he hal!'
already freq uent.Iy done in the !'phere of
domestic politics.
It goeR without saying t.hnt t.he Senate is.
observing this development with anxiety
and displewltlre. One of the results has
been that, in order not to lose its influence
in foreign politics, the Senate has in turn
held out its hand toward the President by
nominating n Senate Commit.tee for Postwar
Questions, which is to keep in touch with
the President ami the State Depa.rtment',:
This gives Roosevelt the chance not only
to influence the Senate just now in tho way
he wants but also to say later on: "1 have
dono everything with your knowledge and
your a.ppro\"l\l," thus cutting the ground
from under the feet of any future opposit.ion.•
AMERJCAN DOUBTS
The quotations mentioned above as well
as aU other recent information on American
"iews allow one to draw certain conclusions.
In the words of Tom, Dick, allli Harry, these
might at present run something like this:
;'Because we Americans were too self·
centered in our period of isolation, the rest
of the world made a meS8 of things and
allowed the rise of Naziism and Nipponism.
The result waa war. We could not idly
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look on while the democracies collapsed, so
we were drawn into the war. We have
tamed the country's economy upside down,
we have put twelve million of our boys into
uniform, we have suffered more than half a·
million c!L8ualtie3 already-all for the sake
of victory. When this victory comes, its
fruits must be worth the sacrifices. Above
all, there must be the certainty that never
again will a situation arise like the one in
1938,'41. At first we hoped to obtain this
by the co-operation of the entire world
(minus Germany and Japan). But we've
been let down too often. We cannot really
rely on any of the other United Nations: it
is up to America to organize the postwar
world and to back up this organizing job
With the biggest navy and air force and
bases at every strategic point. If we can-
not build the millenium of human brother-
hood, at least we shall give the world an
Americ!\n Century with some good Yankee
horse senst>. And the United Nations'~
Well, where would they be without our
Lend-Lease. our Eisenhowers. Kaisers,
Nimitzes? They'd better comply-or else'"
These ideas arc one-sided and confused.
But their chief drawback ia that the Amer-
ican himself lacks confidence in his ability
~ live up to them. At the back of his
mind there is doubt. How can America, he
thinks, solve the world's problems when
before the war she had over ten million
Wlemployed herself'~ "Before they try to
IlStablish a new world order, the United
States should restore order in its own house."
This statement in Dewey's campaign speech
at St. Louis on October 17 mirrored the
opinion of many millions. (How little the
Americans feel sure of the superior appeal
of the .. American Wav" and its effect on
other nations is 8howil by their plans for
Germany and Japan. Cut Cennany up
into three or more pieces, destroy her in-
dustry. take away her resources, deprive
.Japan of ever,ything but her islands-those
are the suggestions, not one constructive
idea alDong them.)
There are other doubts, too: "What if the
USSR should refuse to take orders from
Americn) What if Germany and Japan
refuse to give in, if they keep on fighting
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for every Yillage and every isla.ncH Our
losses are mounting steadily, and our leaders
tell us that the main fight is still to come.
'Ve have been at war for three years. How
much longer is it supposed to last'~"
It is owing to these doubts that American
world imperialism and isolationism (which
also includes hemispheric imperialism) are
linked so closely together, and that the
same US Senate which is making plans for
the whole world also advocates "a band of
l:Iteel around the Western Hemisphere." In
the opinion of Walter Lippman, one of
America's leading ideologists, this hemi-
sphere should al80 include the British Empire,
Western and Southern Europe--in all '2
states with over 500 million inhabitantS-
and be called the "Atlantic Community."
In other words, the imperialistic designs
which they accused Germany and Japan of
having toward Europe and East Asia. are
being harbored by the Americans themselves
toward the entire world, or at least its
Western Hemisphere.
*
"They'd hetter comply-or eL~e~" was
how we paraphrased the American attitude
toward the rest of the world. This "or else"
can mean two thing8-force or isoltttion.
Roosevelt is more for the first alternative,
Dewey was more for the second. The narrow
margin of Roosevelt'a; victory, counted in
individual votes, proves that the second
alternative has a strong attract.ion for mil-
lions of Americans.
In considering America's attitude toward
the world. one must always bear in mind
the ease with which l:Ihe cun shift the em-
phasis from one to the other of t.he three
principles of her foreign policy. In the
summer of 1941, Fortune's poll of publ'e
opinion, regarded as one of the most reliable
in the country, found a bare 13 per (,ent of
Americans in favor of US participation in
any kind of international organization. In
March 1944, that figure had soared to
08 per ceut. In a country where such a
complete about-face has taken place in the
last three years, another about-face may
take place in the next three years too.
On the way home from 1\ dinner party she said:
"1 don't think 1'\-e ever been 80 ashamed in my tife. George. You were
the only one among the men thia evening who did not· have Ii postwar plan."
